#Absolute lojack dell uefi how to#
#Absolute lojack dell uefi update#
#Absolute lojack dell uefi code#

Subject: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 Subject: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011

Issuer: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010.

Subject: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011ĭigital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign, CA

Issuer: C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root.

#Absolute lojack dell uefi code#

UEFI Platform Key Expired in 2014, Digital Signature, Code Signing, not a CA Subject: DC=com, DC=dell, OU=1, OU=Signing, CN=Dell Inc. Issuer: DC=com, DC=dell, CN=Configuration, CN=Services, CN=Public Key Services, CN=AIA, CN=Dell Inc.On a Dell Latitude E5470, the following keys were found to be pre-installed: Typical implementations will have a hardware OEM’s key stored in PK, and OS vendor keys stored in KEK and db. A good read on what these keys and databases are used for can be found in the blog by James Bottomley or in the Ubuntu Wiki. It contains a Platform Key (PK), a Key Exchange Key database (KEK), a Signature Database (db) and a Forbidden Signature Database (dbx), which are all stored in so-called UEFI variables. The UEFI acts as a trust anchor for the Secure Boot chain.

#Absolute lojack dell uefi how to#

In this blog, we will describe the standard Secure Boot configuration of a Fedora 29 installation on a Dell Latitude E5470 laptop, which we use in our day-to-day work, and show you how to harden it to a reasonable extent. Can mechanisms like Fedora’s “shim” or Linux Foundation’s “pre-bootloader” be used to execute unsigned code?.How far does my Linux distribution extend the chain of trust?.

#Absolute lojack dell uefi update#

What entities are entitled to enroll or update public keys, signatures and hashes in UEFI firmware?.What entities actually have control over the private key counterparts?.While such efforts may sound appealing at first, security-conscious individuals may have the following concerns: The basic idea behind Secure Boot is that the UEFI firmware may only redirect control flow to those bootloaders that it could cryptographically verify against a pre-distributed set of public keys, signatures and hashes of executable modules. It was introduced in the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) 2.3.1 specification (Errata C) in 2012, and has widely been adopted by computer manufacturers since then. What is worse than a failing system? A (silently) compromised, yet operational system! While there are many attack vectors that allow for the compromise of a modern computer system, Secure Boot tries to address one of them: It aims to secure the pre-boot environment against unauthenticated manipulations such as rootkits and bootkits. This blog is from the CrowdStrike Intelligence Advanced Research Team Motivation